Wendy Harris v. Shopko Stores, Inc : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2010
Wendy Harris v. Shopko Stores, Inc : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Alain C. Balmanno; Ruth A. Shapiro; Christensen & Jensen; Attorneys for Appellee.
Michael E. Day; Nathan Wittaker; Day Shell & Liljenquist; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Harris v. Shopko Stores, Inc, No. 20100106 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2160
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WENDY HARRIS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
SHOPKO STORES, INC., 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case no. 20100106-CA 
Dist. Ct. Case no. 070101906 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from a Final Judgment of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, 
The Honorable Christine Johnson Presiding 
Alain C. Balmanno (3985) 
Ruth A. Shapiro (9356) 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Michael E. Day (7843) 
Nathan Whittaker (11978) 
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST, L.C. 
45 E. Vine St. 
Murray, UT 84107 
Attorneys for Appellee Attorneys for Appellant 
^ ^ G O ^ tfS 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
^ ^ 
& 
(&* 
vc* o\ 
^ 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WENDY HARRIS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
SHOPKO STORES, INC., 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case no. 20100106-CA 
Dist. Ct. Case no. 070101906 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from a Final Judgment of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, 
The Honorable Christine Johnson Presiding 
Alain C. Balmanno (3985) 
Ruth A. Shapiro (9356) 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Michael E. Day (7843) 
Nathan Whittaker (11978) 
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST, L.C. 
45 E. Vine St. 
Murray, UT 84107 
Attorneys for Appellee Attorneys for Appellant 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Authorities ii 
Argument ...1 
I. THE JURY'S AWARD WAS NOT JUSTIFIED BY THE EVIDENCE 1 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRONEOUS RULINGS PREVENTED PLAINTIFF FROM 
HAVING A FAIR TRIAL AND WARRANT REVERSAL 4 
A. The trial court erred in excluding portions of Plaintiff s deposition 
transcript from evidence 5 
B. The trial court erred in excluding the chair specification sheet from 
evidence 12 
C. The trial court improperly instructed the jury to reduce future 
damages to present value 16 
D. The trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding 
apportionment of damages between the injuries caused by Defendant 
and symptomatic pre-existing conditions 18 
E. The trial court improperly allowed counsel for Defendant to elicit 
testimony that Dr. Rosenthal's expert report was drafted by Counsel 
for Plaintiff 19 
F. The trial court improperly excluded the testimony of Tom Harris 
relating to Wendy's intimate relationship with her husband 20 
G. The trial court improperly allowed Dr. Colledge's written 
Curriculum Vitae to be admitted as documentary evidence 22 
III. PLAINTIFF ADEQUATELY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE IN HER OPENING BRIEF 23 
Conclusion 25 
Proof of Service 26 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Arnica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989) 9 
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844 (Utah 1998) 7 
Beard v. K-Mart Corp., 2000 UT App 285, 12 P.3d 1015 19 
Berry v. Federated Mutual Ins. Co., 110F.R.D. 441 (N.D. Ind. 1986) 13 
Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d461 (Utah 1996) 7 
Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80 (Utah App. 1987) 2, 3 
Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876P.2d415 (Utah App. 1994) 15 
Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425 (Utah 1998) 24 
Doctor John's, Inc. v. City ofRoy, 465 F .3d 1150 (10th Cir. 2006) 7 
Gallegos v. Dick Simon Trucking, 2004 UT App. 322, 110 P.3d 710 17, 18 
Garcia v. Wal-Mart Stores, 209 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2000) 19 
Gillv. MS, 420 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2005) 7 
Gonzales v. Boas, 874 A.2d 491 (Md. App. 2005) 13 
Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414 (1953) 16 
Guest v. Allstate Ins. Co., 205 P.3d 844 (N.M. App. 2009) 13 
Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552 (\941) 7 
John Call Engineering v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1987) 6 
Johnson Int'l Co. v. Jackson Nat'I Life Ins. Co., 812 F. Supp. 966 (D. Neb. 
1993) 13 
Juddv. Rowley's Cherry Hill Orchards, Inc. 611 P.2d, 1216 (Utah 1980) 3 
Langelandv. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1998) 14 
Mikkelsenv. Haslam, 764 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1988) 18 
Momandv. Paramount Pictures Distributing Co., 36 F. Supp. 568 (D. 
Mass. 1941) 13 
Motive Parts Warehouse v. Facet Enterprises, 11A F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 
1985) 22 
Richlin Security Service Co. v. Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571 (2008) 7 
Robinson v. All-Star Delivery, 992 P.2d 969 (Utah 1999) 2, 5 
Rukavina v. Triatlantic Adventures, Inc., 931 P.2d 122 (Utah 1997) 23 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) 9 
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992) 5 
State v. /jrw/n, 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996) 6,7,8 
State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650 (Utah 1985) 16 
State v. Markwardt, 742 N.W.2d 546 (Wis. App. 2007) 7 
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989) 22, 23 
Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339 (Utah 1996) 9 
United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 352 F.3d 1325 (10th Cir. 2003) 8 
Utah R. App. P. 11 15 
Van Wagenen v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 170F.R.D. 86 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) 13 
Vintero Corp. v. Corporacion Venezolana De Fomento, 675 F.2d 513 (2d 
Cir. 1982) 8 
West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah App. 
1991) 24 
Williams v. Barber, 765 P.2d 887 (Utah 1988) 9 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
7 Moore's Federal Practice § 36.10 (3d ed. 1997) 13, 14 
Briefof Appellant, Biswell v.Duncan (No. 860124-CA) 3 
MUJI2dCV2018 3 
Robert W. Gibbs, Prejudicial Error: Admissions and Exclusions of 
Evidence in the Federal Courts, 3. Vill. L. Rev. 48 (1957) 21 
RULES 
UJCA 14-301 15 
Utah R. App. P. 24 23 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26 13 
Utah R. Civ. P. 36 12, 13 
Utah R. Civ. P. 37 13 
UtahR.Evid. 103 21 
Utah R. Evid. 607 16 
Utah R. Evid. 901 13 
ARGUMENT 
The fundamental questions before this Court are whether the jury's award was 
justified by the evidence and whether Plaintiff had a fair trial. As Plaintiff has shown in 
the arguments of her opening brief, the answer to both of those questions is no. This 
Court should reverse the trial court's decision and remand for a new trial. Because space 
is limited, this brief will address only those arguments in Defendant's response that were 
not already addressed in the opening brief. 
I. THE JURY'S AWARD WAS NOT JUSTIFIED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
In its brief, Defendant speaks of the "great deal of evidence supporting the 
verdict," all the while ignoring the relevant legal standards and Plaintiffs arguments 
showing that the evidence does not justify the verdict. Defendant's interpretation of a 
"reasonably necessary" medical expense would not allow for any treatment that reduces 
pain, and would require that both Wendy and her doctors be omniscient as to what 
treatment would work. This is not the definition of "reasonably necessary" in Utah law, 
which allows a party to recoup expenses for treatments that appear likely, based on the 
information available to the party at the time, to mitigate the pain and suffering and 
reduce the injury of the patient. Defendant also ignores the rule that to apportion injury to 
a pre-existing condition, it has to be symptomatic at the time of the accident and that 
there must be evidence that would allow the jury to make a reasonable apportionment. 
Rather than addressing that standard, Defendant gives a laundry list of Wendy's 
asymptomatic conditions and ignores that there was no evidence of apportioning the 
causes of Wendy's pain. Defendant has also misstated the record in several places 
throughout its brief. There was no evidentiary basis for discounting Plaintiffs past and 
future medical expenses, and Robinson v. All-Star Delivery, 992 P.2d 969 (Utah 1999),2 
and common sense show conclusively that $1,000.00 is an unconscionably low amount of 
damages for Plaintiffs injuries. 
The remainder of Defendant's argument regarding the issues of the economic and 
non-economic damages awards go to the interpretation of two Utah court cases, which 
Plaintiff will now address. In Biswell v. Duncan, this Court stated that pre-existing 
conditions must be symptomatic in order to reduce a party's recovery. 742 P.2d 80, 88. 
Defendant attempts to deal with Biswell, but in so doing, misstates the facts of the case 
and the law. First, Defendant attempts to distinguish Biswell by saying that in that case, 
"there was no evidence opposing plaintiffs assertion that all her pain was the result of 
the accident." This is not true. The opinion states: 
Although Biswell suffered from degenerative changes in her spine prior to 
the accident, at trial she claimed that her prior conditions and ailments had 
been resolved and that she suffered no symptoms before the accident. 
1. In its brief, Defendant made many statements that were unsupported by the record, 
such as "Dr. Rosenthal testified . . . that he could not testify to a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty that Harris would need dilaudid in the future," and "Dr. Colledge 
testified that Plaintiffs pain . . . was not caused by the Shopko incident." For reasons of 
space, Plaintiff will not go through a point-by point rebuttal, but urges the Court to verify 
the following citations and compare the record to the representations located on the 
following pages of Defendant's brief: at 6 (Tr. 593:25-594:19); at 7 (Tr. 543:10-544:10), 
(Tr. 324:16-25, 325: 12-14), (Tr. 250: 9-21, 325:5-11); at 8 (Tr. 298:16-21), (Tr. 535:8-9, 
535:23-536:12); at 9 (Tr. 589:22-590:12), (Tr. 587:20-588:14), (Tr. 590:13-591:4); at 12 
(Tr. 585:8-13), (Tr.586:10-19); at 31 (Tr. at 586:10-19; 584:12-20; 594:10-19). 
2. Robinson was cited for the fact that the Plaintiff in that case was awarded 
$1,000.00 while the evidence of his injuries was orders of magnitude lower than 
Plaintiffs injuries. Notwithstanding the limited injuries, the court still found that there 
was a good possibility that the plaintiff would recover more upon remand. 
2 
Biswell alleged that it was only after the accident that she experienced the 
pain she currently endures in her lower back. 
Id; see also Brief of Appellant, Biswell v. Duncan (No. 860124-CA) at 3 (explaining that 
BiswelPs experts "assigned a 3 to 5 percent rating to the pre-existing condition.")-"' 
Unlike in this case, where there was no evidence that Wendy's conditions were 
symptomatic, there was conflicting evidence in Biswell as to whether the Plaintiff was 
symptomatic. 
Defendant also states that "Harris was simply unable to clearly establish that her 
pain derived from and was caused solely by the ShopKo incident." However, this is not 
Plaintiffs burden—if there is no reasonable basis for determining the contribution of 
each cause, then a jury must conclude that the entire harm was caused by the tortfeasor. 
See MUJI 2d CV2018. Defendant did not provide any evidence that Wendy was suffering 
from symptomatic pre-existing conditions, and did not provide the jury with a reasonable 
basis for apportionment of the damages. 
Judd v. Rowley's Cherry Hill Orchards, Inc. holds that an award for economic 
damages must be based on the evidence of damages that was presented to the jury. See 
611 P.2d, 1216, 1221 (Utah 1980). From this we can infer that an award that bears no 
relationship to the amounts given to the jury as the reasonable amount of medical 
expenses, then it is likely that the award was not based on that evidence. Defendant offers 
a Florida case that talks about compromise verdicts, but there has been no claim of a 
compromise verdict in this case. Rather, Plaintiffs claim is that to calculate economic 
damages, the jury would take the total amount of the figures and deduct the expenses that 
3. The full brief can be found in Volume 16 of the Utah Court of Appeals Briefs in 
the State Law Library of the Matheson Courthouse. 
3 
they did not believe were reasonably necessary. There is no combination of figures 
submitted to the jury that would reach $15,000.00 in past medical expenses, and so the 
Court can infer that the jury did not go through this process. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRONEOUS RULINGS PREVENTED PLAINTIFF FROM 
HAVING A FAIR TRIAL AND WARRANT REVERSAL. 
The next issue the Court must decide is whether the trial court's errors, viewed 
cumulatively, prevented Plaintiff from having a fair trial. Plaintiff argued in the opening 
brief that the trial court's decision to limit motions in limine created a climate where 
errors abound, since even though the party submitting the motion in limine would be 
familiar with the relevant case law on a particular issue, the other party and the trial court 
would not be so fortunate. The trial court's unfamiliarity with the applicable law was a 
decisive factor in many of the errors that Plaintiff was prejudiced by. The trial court 
committed error by (a) disallowing use of Plaintiff s deposition transcript, (b) excluding 
the specification sheet for the chair that factored in to Wendy's accident, (c) charging the 
jury as to present value and (d) symptomatic pre-existing conditions without any 
evidence to support the charge, (e) admitting testimony as to "Delayed Recovery 
Syndrome" and (f) the authorship of Dr. Rosenthal's expert report, (g) excluding Mr. 
Harris's testimony as to Wendy's intimate relationship with her husband, and (h) 
improperly admitting a hearsay document. Because of the number and magnitude of these 
errors there is little doubt that Plaintiff was denied a fair trial.4 
4. Because Defendant has not raised any substantial issue that was not adequately 
addressed in the opening brief on the "Delayed Recovery Syndrome" and cumulative 
error points, Plaintiff will not address those issues in this brief. 
4 
Prejudicial error. Defendant argues on nearly every issue that any error was 
harmless, citing alternate reasons why the jury may have found the way it did. While the 
substance of this claim is dealt with supra in Point I, it is worth noting that Defendant 
fails to analyze harmful error within the proper framework. "For an error to require 
reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine 
confidence in the verdict." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 832, 840 (Utah 1992). As Plaintiff 
stated in her opening brief, the lower the award is within the zone of reasonableness, the 
more likely that any error would have adversely affected the award. Also, as Plaintiff 
showed by comparing this case to Robinson v. All Star Delivery, the award of $1,000.00 
in non-economic damages is extraordinarily low for the injuries that Wendy suffered. The 
threshold for any piece of evidence to undermine confidence in the verdict in this case is 
therefore fairly low. 
A. The trial court erred in excluding portions of Plaintiffs deposition 
transcript from evidence. 
One of the fundamental rules of our judicial system is that the appellate court does 
not give a party a second bite at the apple. The parties are supposed to offer all of their 
evidence, make all of their objections, and raise all of their legal theories so that the trial 
court has an opportunity to press or pass upon the issue. But what happens when the trial 
court makes an ambiguous5 ruling, such that one of the parties believes that the issue was 
5. It is important to make the distinction between a ruling that is vague (the meaning 
is not clear in context) and one that is ambiguous (susceptible to two or more reasonable 
but conflicting interpretations). While a ruling that is vague may oblige a party to request 
clarification, an ambiguous ruling may seem to be perfectly clear to a reasonable person, 
who, given the extemporaneous nature of court proceedings, has no time to ponder 
alternate interpretations of the ruling. The question is whether it was reasonable under the 
circumstances to not seek further clarification. 
^ 
raised and decided upon when the Court intended to decide a different issue? An 
ambiguous ruling has consequences. The question before this Court is whether the 
consequences of that ambiguity should be borne solely by the party who relied on a 
mistaken belief or by the trial court and both parties equally. The principles of equity 
allow for rescission of a contract on grounds of mistake of fact.6 It stands to reason that 
those same principles would allow for a new trial under similar circumstances. 
In its brief, Defendant has conceded Plaintiffs interpretive rule that an appellate 
court should interpret a ruling in the same way that the appealing party did, so long as 
that interpretation is reasonable. Also, Defendant does not challenge that Plaintiff 
actually believed that the trial court had ruled that Plaintiff could not use the deposition 
transcript to clarify the portions of the transcript introduced by Defendant, that Plaintiff 
relied upon her interpretation of the court's ruling to her detriment, or that such a ruling 
would be in error. Defendant only advances three arguments in its brief: first, that the 
assertion that the ruling was ambiguous was not raised below; second, that Plaintiffs 
interpretation of the trial court's ruling was not reasonable; and third, that any error was 
harmless. Plaintiff will deal with these in order. 
The question of the proper interpretation of the trial court's ruling is properly 
before this Court. While Defendant correctly states the general rule that a party who 
"fails to bring an issue before the trial court is generally barred from raising it on the first 
time on appeal," State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah App. 1996), it simply concludes that 
the rule applies in this case without any further analysis. However, Defendant focuses on 
6. See John Call Engineering v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1209-10 (Utah 
1987) (setting forth the test for rescission on unilateral mistake of fact). 
6 
a subsidiary argument, rather than the issue—whether the trial court's ruling was in error. 
Defendant also ignores the extraordinary circumstances exception. 
The distinction between a new issue on appeal on one hand and additional 
authority and analysis on the other is a murky one; there is "no bright-line rule to 
determine whether an issue has been properly raised in the trial court." Doctor John's, 
Inc. v. City of Roy, 465 F.3d 1150, 1172 (10th Cir. 2006). The question of whether to 
address any issue on appeal is left to the discretion of the appellate court to apply the 
"rules of fundamental justice." Hormelv. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941); see 
Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 464 n.l (Utah 1996); Irwin, 924 P.2d at 
8. Whether a particular issue or argument has been properly raised below depends on (1) 
whether the question is a separate issue or a subsidiary legal argument to a properly 
raised issue, and (2) whether, given the circumstances, the trial court had an adequate 
o 
opportunity to address the issue below. Whether the Court should apply the exceptional 
circumstances doctrine should turn on (1) whether there was an opportunity to address 
7. See Richlin Security Service Co. v. Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571, 579 n.4 (2008) 
(holding that "subsidiary questions" that must be addressed to answer the larger issues 
before the court are properly before the Court); Gill v. INS, 420 F.3d 82, 86-87 (2d Cir. 
2005) (subsidiary legal arguments are properly considered by an appellate court, even if 
not made below); State v. Markwardt, 742 N.W.2d 546, 555-56 (Wis. App. 2007) 
(citation to additional authority and legal analysis on appeal does not constitute "new 
argument" or advancement of a new theory on appeal.). 
8. See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998) (setting forth 
specific factors for determining whether a trial court had an opportunity to address the 
issue below.). 
7 
the issue below, and (2) whether the issue is a pure issue of law that can be decided on 
the existing record.10 
First, the ambiguity of the trial court's ruling is a subsidiary argument to the main 
issue: whether the trial court's ruling regarding the deposition was in error. To decide 
whether the lower court's ruling was in error, this Court must interpret the ruling, 
including deciding the question of how to construe any ambiguities. The rule that 
ambiguous rulings should be decided consistently with the appellant's reasonable 
interpretation is a legal argument that would assist the Court in interpreting the ruling, not 
a separate issue that would have required preservation. 
Second, under the circumstances, the question of the proper interpretation of the 
court's ruling was adequately raised. Before the trial court's memorandum decision, 
Plaintiff believed that the ruling prevented her from using the deposition transcript to 
clarify other portions of the deposition read into evidence. Plaintiffs motion for a new 
trial made her understanding clear. (R. at 1013.) At that point, the trial court was on 
notice that the issue of the proper interpretation of the ruling was at issue, and explicitly 
rejected Plaintiffs interpretation. (R. at 1135.) Given that Plaintiff did not know that the 
trial court intended its ruling to apply solely to form until after trial court stated so in its 
9. See Irwin, 924 P.2d at 10-11 (exceptional circumstances exist where otherwise 
"there would have been no ready opportunity for appellate review."); United States v. 
Hernandez-Rodriguez, 352 F.3d 1325, 1328 (10th Cir. 2003) ("We conclude that when 
the district court explicitly resolves an issue of law on the merits, the appellant may 
challenge that ruling on appeal even if he failed to raise the issue in district court."). 
10. See, e.g., Vintero Corp. v. Corporacion VenezolanaDe Fomento, 675 F.2d 513, 
515 (2d Cir. 1982) ("Arguments made on appeal need not be identical to those made 
below, however, if the elements of the claim were set forth and additional findings of fact 
are not required. Therefore when a party raises new contentions that involve only 
questions of law, an appellate court may consider the new issues."). 
8 
memorandum decision, there could be no reasonable expectation that she was to provide 
legal authority to support her interpretation. Plaintiff raised the issue as adequately as 
could be expected under the circumstances, and this Court should hold that the issue of 
the proper interpretation of the trial court's ruling was adequately preserved. 
However, even if the issue were not properly preserved, exceptional circumstances 
apply that would make it manifestly unjust to decline to address the proper interpretation 
of the trial court's ruling, as there was no opportunity to address the question before 
appeal. Plaintiff was not made aware that the trial court intended its ruling to apply solely 
to form until after trial court stated so in its memorandum decision. There was no way 
that Plaintiff could have raised an issue that it was not aware of. Because filing a second 
motion for a new trial would have been improper, see Arnica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 
768 P.2d 950, 969 (Utah App. 1989), this is the first opportunity that Plaintiff has had to 
explicitly address the issue.11 
Application of the exceptional circumstances doctrine would be appropriate here 
because the proper interpretation of a court's ruling presents a pure question of law. See 
Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339 (Utah 1996). The record is adequate to rule on the 
question, and so the prudential considerations behind the practice of denying review to 
11. It appears that the cases outlining the rule interpreting ambiguous rulings have 
done so without specific preservation of the question of whether the ruling was 
ambiguous. In State v. Dunn, the court looked at ambiguity based on Defendant's 
assertion of what the ruling meant. See 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). In Williams v. 
Barber, the appellant misinterpreted an ambiguous ruling on the burden of proof, and did 
not discover his error until after the trial court had entered its final judgment. See 765 
P.2d 887, 890 (Utah 1988). It is unlikely that the appellant raised the issue before the trial 
court. 
o 
issues not raised below do not apply in this case. The Court should therefore review the 
proper interpretation of the Court's ruling on the deposition transcript. 
Plaintiffs understanding of the trial court's ruling was reasonable under the 
circumstances. Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs understanding of the ruling was 
not reasonable. Defendant does not address any of Plaintiff s arguments in support of this 
proposition—the fact that Defendant's objection had been to the "improper use of a 
deposition," that the Court itself was in the better position to see Plaintiffs confusion and 
clarify its ruling, and that the method of introducing the deposition was correct as a 
matter of form. Defendant only argues that "given that this was the second time the issue 
had arisen," Plaintiffs interpretation of the ruling as disallowing use of the deposition 
transcript was not reasonable. 
The previous episode that Defendant refers to is as follows: 
Q. [by Mr. Day] Just a few questions, Dr. Hogenson. I want to draw you back to 
page 14 of that deposition. 
A. [Dr. Hogenson] Yes. 
Q. That's the one you just read out of with Ms. Shapiro. I'd like you to follow 
along with me from—in fact, let's start with the question on line 12, and then you 
can answer the answer that comes after that on line 16. Okay? 
MS. SHAPIRO: Your Honor, I don't believe this is a proper use of the deposition. 
He hasn 't given any inconsistent testimony in which to use the deposition. 
MR. DAY: I'm simply trying to put into context the—she read the part of the 
deposition that comes exactly after that. 
THE COURT: Why don 'tyou ask the question first and allow him to respond. 
MR. DAY: Okay. 
THE COURT: If you need to refresh his recollection with that subsequently, then 
certainly you're welcome to do that. 
Q. This is the question and then let's wait for your response. "QUESTION"—and 
this would be a question Ms. Shapiro was asking at your deposition. "At this point 
she's a year and a half post-incident from Shopko. Is it your opinion that 
managing her pain through the pharmacy was the way to go?" And let me just— 
in 
instead of reading that in the deposition, was it your opinion that managing her 
pain through pharmaceutical or medication—was that the way to treat her? 
A. Yes. 
(Tr. 363:21-365:2 (emphasis added).) This exchange validates Plaintiffs understanding 
of the trial court's subsequent ruling. It is clear from the context here that the Court 
erroneously ruled that Plaintiff could not read in the deposition, just like the ruling 
complained of on appeal. Ms. Shapiro's objection was that a witness must make an 
inconsistent statement before the witness could refer to the deposition. Mr. Day responds 
that he has the right to put the statement into context, and the Court rules that he must ask 
a question first, and only use the deposition transcript if the witness needs to refresh his 
recollection. Plaintiff complies, and the witness does not read in or otherwise use the 
transcript. Given that the trial court ruled in this exchange that the deposition could not be 
read in, but only used to refresh recollection, it was reasonable for Mr. Day to assume 
that when Ms. Shapiro later objected that Mr. Day's use of the deposition was improper 
and the trial court told him to ask a question, that the court had made the same ruling. 
While Mr. Day managed to elicit the relevant testimony with Dr. Hogenson 
without reading in the deposition transcript, that opportunity was not available in 
Wendy's case. Mr. Day had two objectives in reading in the deposition testimony: to 
rehabilitate Wendy's credibility and to show the jury that Ms. Shapiro was 
misrepresenting the contents of the deposition. Ms. Shapiro's selective use of the 
deposition gave the false impression that Wendy's testimony on the stand contradicted 
her deposition testimony, and that she had a much higher ability to perform the activities 
of daily living than was actually the case. Just asking Wendy what she remembered of her 
deposition testimony would not have cured the prejudicial effect that Plaintiff suffered by 
11 
not being allowed to show the jury exactly what words Ms. Shapiro left out of the 
transcript.12 
Harmful Error. Because non-economic damages are incapable of exact 
determination, a major determinative factor in any award for non-economic damages is 
whether the jury trusts and empathizes with the plaintiff. Because evidence excluded by 
the trial court went to Wendy's credibility, it was very likely than any to have adversely 
affected the award of non-economic damages. The trial court acknowledged this in its 
decision. Because of the low threshold for a piece of evidence to affect the award and 
because of the central nature of the evidence to her credibility, this error is harmful. 
B. The trial court erred in excluding the chair specification sheet from 
evidence. 
When it was a party to the litigation, the manufacturer of the chair that figured in 
to Wendy's accident at Shopko produced a specification sheet giving the dimensions and 
specifications of the chair. Plaintiff sought to admit this specification sheet to establish 
the maximum height of the chair. The court's exclusion of this for lack of foundation was 
in error, since the foundation was admitted to under Rule 36 and any objection to its 
admission was waived under Rule 26(a)(4). 
Rule 36 admissions. Defendant argues that facts admitted by a party pursuant to 
Utah R. Civ. P. 36 cannot be used to establish the authenticity of a document. This is 
incorrect. "Requests for admission may ask the party to whom the request is addressed to 
admit the genuineness of any described document." 7 Moore's Federal Practice § 
12. This argument is not an admission that a party must exhaust all alternate means of 
introducing the evidence before Defendant's right to challenge the error on appeal, as 
explained infra in Part X.A. 
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36.10[9] (3d ed. 1997). In fact, the origin of Rule 36 was Equity Rule 58, which 
provided for the "admission of the execution and genuineness of documents." Momand v. 
Paramount Pictures Distributing Co., 36 F. Supp. 568, 572 (D. Mass. 1941). The 
continuing relevance of the rule's original purpose is found in both the federal and Utah 
version of Rule 37, which calls for sanctions "if a party fails to admit the genuineness of 
any document or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if the party 
requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the document or the truth 
of the matter . . . ." See also Johnson InVl Co. v. Jackson Nat'I Life Ins. Co., 812 F. Supp. 
966 (D. Neb. 1993) (sanctioning a party for refusing to admit the authenticity of medical 
and prescription records). 
Defendant's argument that Utah R. Evid. 901 does not allow for authentication by 
admission is also incorrect. While Rule 901 provides several methods by which 
authentication can be accomplished, the rule expressly states that those methods are listed 
"[b]y way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation . . . ." Also, subsection (b)(10) 
of that rule allows for authentication by means of "[a]ny method of authentication or 
identification provided by court rule or statute of this state." This would presumably 
include an admission, since a fact admitted to under Rule 36 is "conclusively 
established . . . for the purpose of the pending action." Utah R. Civ. P. 36(b). 
Finally, Defendant's invokes Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) to argue that "admission of 
a fact in discovery does not waive any objection to admissibility, nor does it waive any 
13. See also Van Wagenen v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 170 F.R.D. 86, 87 (N.D.N. Y. 
1997); Berry v. Federated Mutual Ins. Co., 110 F.R.D. 441, 443 (N.D. Ind. 1986); 
Gonzales v. Boas, 874 A.2d 491, 500 (Md. App. 2005); Guest v. Allstate Ins. Co., 205 
P.3d 844, 860 (N.M. App. 2009). 
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objection to foundation." However, Moore's Federal Practice explains that because 
admissions are not designed to discover facts, Rule 26 does not apply: 
Request for admission do not serve the same purpose as other discovery 
because requests for admission are not designed to elicit or discover facts 
but rather to eliminate issues not really in dispute between parties. By 
contrast, for example, interrogatories are designed to elicit relevant 
information that may or may not be admissible, but that may appear 
reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence. 
7 Moore }s Federal Practice § 36.02[2]; see also Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 
P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah 1998) ("The policy behind rule 36 is to facilitate and expedite the 
discovery process by allowing parties to obtain admissions as to certain undisputed 
matters and thus avoid the effort and expense of having to conduct discovery as to those 
matters."); 7 Moore }s Federal Practice § 36.02[1] (requests for admission are not 
discovery). It is clear beyond doubt that Rule 36 admissions can be used to lay a 
foundation for the introduction of documents, and so the trial court's ruling was in error. 
Waiver under Rule 26(a)(4). While the admission conclusively established the 
foundation, there is yet another reason that the trial court should have overruled any 
objection to foundation: Defendant waived the objection by failing to make the objection 
in writing within two weeks of Plaintiff s pre-trial disclosures. While Defendant argues 
that the trial court found good cause to excuse the waiver, it does not answer the fact that 
the ruling was an abuse of discretion, as there was no good-faith dispute over the 
authenticity of the document, and Plaintiff actually relied upon Defendant's waiver in not 
getting a foundational witness. Defendant's argument about why the court found good 
cause is also unsupported by the record. While Defendant states that Plaintiff did not ask 
Defendant to stipulate to the document, there is no support in the record for that 
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proposition,14 and Plaintiff submits that such an assertion is patently false.15 Regardless, 
Defendant has never raised any grounds to dispute the authenticity of the document. 
Refusal to admit or to stipulate to the authenticity of the document without a reasonable 
belief that the document is not genuine is cause for sanction under Rule 37 and a 
violation of the Standards of Professionalism and Civility, see UJCA 14-301(10). Based 
on this, it is clear that a desire to "put a party to its proof on this issue does not constitute 
good cause to excuse a party's failure to object to the foundation of a document. 
Harmful Error. Exclusion of the specification sheet was prejudicial, as Plaintiff 
should have been allowed to provide evidence that the chair extended to a height of 21.25 
inches. Defendant argues that since there was no evidence as to the height of the chair at 
the time of Wendy's accident, this evidence would have been irrelevant. However, the 
actual chair was in ShopKo's possession, and they either lost or destroyed it. (Tr. 452:9-
20; 462:5-15.) Because the jury could draw an adverse inference from ShopKo's failure 
to produce the chair, it was proper for the jury to consider the maximum height of the 
chair. See Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah App. 1994). 
Second, Defendant argues that because there was an exemplar chair provided by 
Defendant, there was no prejudice. However, taking a chair that may or may not have 
been put together the same way as the chair at issue and using a measuring tape to 
14. The portions of Appellant's brief and the record that Defendant cites only indicate 
that the parties did not stipulate, not that no stipulation was requested. 
15. Plaintiff notes that the portion of the audio recording discussing the stipulation is 
inaudible, and therefore, the record is incomplete. (Tr. 439:14-441:21.) While the issue is 
not important enough to justify supplementing the record pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 
11(f), in the interest of accuracy, Plaintiff states that the document was submitted to 
Defendant's counsel, Ms. Shapiro, for stipulation, and she refused to do so. 
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calculate its height is not nearly as reliable or convincing evidence as the manufacturer's 
specifications of the height of the chair. Cf. Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 420-
21 (1953). 
The second reason that the exclusion of the specification sheet was harmful was 
that it deprived Plaintiff of her opportunity to impeach the improper testimony of Ms. 
Shapiro.16 As explained in Plaintiffs opening brief, Ms. Shapiro improperly testified in 
her opening statement that the maximum height of the chair was 19 inches. Any person 
who gives evidence at a trial puts their credibility at issue and is subject to impeachment. 
See Utah R. Evid. 607. This is true for attorneys, as well. See State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 
650, 653 (Utah 1985) ("Once counsel becomes a witness his personal credibility is placed 
at issue before the jury and this may lessen his effectiveness as an advocate."). When Ms. 
Shapiro improperly testified, she put her credibility at issue. It is not unlikely that the 
jury, seeing that Ms. Shapiro's testimony was inaccurate, would discount her credibility 
on other statements and arguments, leading to a higher award of damages. 
C. The trial court improperly instructed the jury to reduce future damages to 
present value. 
The trial court erred by charging the jury to reduce the award of future damages to 
present value where no evidence was presented to allow them to make such a 
determination. Consider the following: you will have expenses of $39,574 over the next 
five years. Some expenses will accrue monthly, some quarterly, some semi-annually. 
16. Defendant's brief misstates the prejudice involved—Plaintiffs interest was not in 
excluding Ms. Shapiro's testimony, rather it was in impeaching her credibility. Therefore, 
the error did not result from Plaintiffs failure to object, but rather from the exclusion of 
the evidence that Plaintiff planned to use to impeach Ms. Shapiro. 
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How much money would you need today, so that if it were prudently invested, would 
cover all $39,574.00 in expenses? By the way, this is a closed-book exam—consulting 
bond rates, savings rates, annuity tables and the like are not allowed. 
This was the question posed to the jury in this case, and the difficulty of deriving 
an answer from one's common sense and everyday experience underscores this Court's 
statement in Gallegos v. Dick Simon Trucking that present value calculations are "almost 
impossible for a jury without assistance." 2004 UT App. 322, If 11, 110 P.3d 710. 
Defendant's position on this issue assumes that lay jurors are familiar enough with 
compound interest, interest rates and methods of investing that they can make a reasoned 
decision on present value. That is not a reasonable assumption. It is more likely that the 
jury, being told that they had to reduce the damages to present value, arbitrarily reduced 
the award, which constitutes harmful error. 
In its brief, Defendant does not argue that the trial court was wrong in assigning it 
the burden of proof on the issue of present value. Rather, it argues that the trial court's 
i n 
order did not obligate them to actually give evidence. However, there is no other way to 
read the court's ruling—if a party has the burden of proof on an issue, then it follows that 
the party would have to submit evidence to prove it. Also, Defendant's reliance on the 
court's statement that "expert testimony . . . is not required to present the issue to the 
jury" is misplaced, as an annuity table, statement of bond yields, or other such evidence 
17. The irony of Defendant's changed position on this issue cannot be overstated. 
Defendant originally contended that Plaintiff had the burden of proof to provide evidence 
to calculate present value, and argued that since she did not produce such evidence in 
discovery, that was grounds to exclude any evidence of future damages. (R. at 235.) Now 
that it is clear that the burden is on Defendant, it argues that no one should have that 
burden. 
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would not be expert testimony. Finally, Defendant attempts to distinguish Gallegos by 
saying that it involved a more complex investment scheme. However, the relevant 
question is whether the present value calculation in this case is sufficiently complex to be 
outside of the common sense of the jury. There is no question that it is. Defendant 
effectively argues that no one has the burden to produce proof on this issue, which is 
inconsistent with the trial court's order, and totally unworkable, as it puts an impossible 
burden on the jury. 
D. The trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding apportionment of 
damages between the injuries caused by Defendant and symptomatic pre-
existing conditions. 
Because there was no evidence of symptomatic pre-existing conditions and no 
competent evidence by which the jury could apportion injuries, the trial court's 
instruction on apportionment was in error. See Mikkelsen v. Haslam, 764 P.2d 1384, 1387 
(Utah App. 1988) (submitting an issue to the jury for which there is no evidence is 
reversible error). As pointed out earlier in the brief, Defendant ignores the distinction 
between symptomatic and asymptomatic pre-existing conditions, and there was no 
evidence that Wendy was symptomatic prior to the accident. Additionally, Defendant 
ignores the fact that there was no expert testimony as to apportionment. Without such 
testimony, there is no reasonable basis for apportionment, and the court improperly 
submitted the instruction to the jury for consideration. As this Court stated previously: 
Where the injury involves obscure medical factors which are beyond an 
ordinary lay person's knowledge, necessitating speculation in making a 
finding, there must be expert testimony that the negligent act probably 
caused the injury. 
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Beard v. K-Mart Corp., 2000 UT App 285, % 16, 12 P.3d 1015. This standard applies 
equally to a defendant seeking to apportion fault to a pre-existing injury. See also Garcia 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, 209 F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir. 2000). 
E. The trial court improperly allowed counsel for Defendant to elicit 
testimony that Dr. RosenthaVs expert report was drafted by Counsel for 
Plaintiff. 
Because the issue of the authorship of Dr. Rosenthal's expert report was not 
relevant and highly prejudicial, the trial court erred in allowing Defendant to elicit that 
testimony. Defendant does not contest the proposition that because the rules were meant 
to encourage attorney drafting as a cost-saving measure, that allowing the opposing party 
to bring up the issue would normally be inappropriate. However, Defendant argues that 
because the report states that Dr. Rosenthal had reviewed the medical records at the time 
of signing the report, when in fact he had only reviewed a summary, that the authorship 
of the report is relevant. This does not follow. The authorship of the report, standing 
alone, does not bear on Dr. Rosenthal's credibility or the weight of his conclusions. It 
was also not a necessary foundation for asking whether the report accurately stated 
whether Dr. Rosenthal had reviewed the medical records by the date of the report. There 
was no necessity to elicit the authorship of the report in order to ask Dr. Rosenthal 
whether the report was accurate, and it was highly prejudicial, as a lay jury could easily 
conclude that attorney drafting was improper and that the attorney was putting words into 
the expert's mouth. Finally, for the reasons stated in Plaintiffs opening brief (and not 
addressed by Defendant), the trial court's jury instruction did not render the error 
harmless. 
1Q 
F. The trial court improperly excluded the testimony of Tom Harris relating 
to Wendy9s intimate relationship with her husband. 
One of the ways that a plaintiff in a personal injury action can show the extent of 
the change in her quality of life is by comparing her life before the injury to her life 
afterwards. Often, a plaintiff will testify to this herself, but it is also good to have a third 
party relate his or her observations to the jury. Plaintiff elicited this "before-and-after" 
testimony from third parties regarding other aspects of her life at the trial. Likewise, Mr. 
Harris was set to give the same kind of testimony about the change in Wendy's intimate 
relationship with her husband after her injuries. 
Defendant concedes that the substance of Mr. Harris's proposed testimony was 
relevant by arguing that Wendy could have testified to the change in her intimate 
relationship with her husband herself. Defendant also does not contest that Wendy's 
testimony was not adequate to cure the harm of excluding Mr. Harris's testimony. 
Instead, Defendant rests its opposition on a novel theory for which it provides no support: 
since Wendy had the opportunity to testify about her intimate relationship, the exclusion 
of Mr. Harris's testimony "should not be the basis for assessing error to the trial court."19 
18. Defendant echoes the trial court in saying that "Mr. Harris' testimony about his 
lack of intimacy would have offered nothing to the jury's consideration of how [Wendy] 
herself had been damaged." However, this misunderstands the nature of the proposed 
testimony. Mr. Harris did not propose to testify about his lack of intimacy, but rather 
about the fact of the decrease in intimacy and his observations about how Wendy's ability 
to enjoy physical intimacy had changed—which is indisputably relevant. 
19. While Defendant phrased the argument in terms of a "tactical decision . . . to not 
have [Wendy] fully develop her . . . testimony," this formulation improperly takes the 
focus off of the claim of error, namely the trial court's exclusion of Mr. Harris's 
testimony. 
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Normally, for a trial court's error to merit reversal by the appeals court, the error 
must be (1) properly be preserved and (2) prejudicial. Defendant's argument seeks to 
introduce a new requirement, heretofore unheard of in Utah law, that a party must also 
exhaust all alternate means of introducing the evidence before the party has right to 
challenge the error on appeal. Defendant provides no authority for this proposition and 
Plaintiff knows of no such requirement in Utah or any other jurisdiction. This is not 
surprising, since such a requirement would be totally unworkable. To determine whether 
a party had exhausted alternate means of introducing excluded evidence, an appellate 
court would have to base its conclusion on evidence that was (by definition) not in the 
record. Defendant's formulation also misunderstands the nature of a claim of error. A 
party does not challenge the right to admit evidence on appeal; rather, the party 
challenges a ruling of the Court. See Utah R. Evid. 103(a). While it may be prudent for a 
party to attempt to introduce evidence by alternate means to try to mitigate the effect of 
an erroneous ruling, such actions are not required to preserve an assignment of error or to 
show that an error was harmful. 
Defendant's insistence that Wendy should have put on the evidence also ignores a 
practical truth about jury trials: the form of the evidence and the identity of the witness 
matter. One commentator has noted that appellate courts are reluctant to conclude that an 
error was harmless "where the record indicates that the excluded evidence would have 
been more persuasive than or would have lent needed corroboration to evidence already 
in the record." Robert W. Gibbs, Prejudicial Error: Admissions and Exclusions of 
Evidence in the Federal Courts, 3. Vill. L. Rev. 48, 59 (1957). 
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G. The trial court improperly allowed Dr. Colledge's written Curriculum 
Vitae to be admitted as documentary evidence. 
Defendant admits that the CV was improperly admitted, but asserts that its 
admission into evidence constituted harmless error. First, Defendant asserts without 
authority that the admission of CVs is a common practice. However, the prevalence of a 
practice is irrelevant to a harmful error analysis—the proper question is whether it is 
likely that a different result would have been reached had the CV not been offered into 
evidence. Defendant next attempts to argue that exclusion of the CV would have been 
meaningless, since Dr. Colledge testified to his credentials. However, this conveniently 
ignores the fact that Ms. Shapiro emphasized the importance of the CV in her closing, 
telling the jurors that they would have it to examine in the jury room. See Motive Parts 
Warehouse v. Facet Enterprises, 11A F.2d 380, 395 (10th Cir. 1985) (emphasizing 
improperly admitted evidence in closing is a factor in determining whether error is 
prejudicial). 
This is a textbook example of using improper hearsay evidence to bolster the 
credibility of a witness. While somewhat different in degree, this question is similar to 
the question in State v. Rimrnasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989). In that case, the principal 
piece of evidence against a man accused of sexual abuse was the testimony of his 
daughter. Id. at 390. The prosecution called four expert witnesses that corroborated what 
she had said in interviews and basically testified that they found her allegations credible. 
Id. at 390-91. The Utah Supreme Court held that the experts' testimony was improper 
under Utah R. Evid. 608(a) and 702. Id. at 391-407. The court held that the admission of 
the testimony was harmful error because the case "hinged on a determination of 
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credibility," and that "the daughter's version of the events was bolstered principally by 
the testimony of the four experts challenged here." Id. at 407. 
In this case, any medical testimony adverse to Plaintiff was offered by Dr. 
Colledge. The only basis that the jurors had in order to decide who to believe was the 
witnesses' credibility as experts. It is certainly not unlikely that the jury, after being 
reminded that they had his qualifications on a document in the jury room, reviewed the 
document and gave more credibility to Dr. Colledge than it otherwise would have if they 
had relied upon their memories of his testimony. In light of the low damages awards in 
this case, the possibility for any improper piece of evidence to affect the outcome is fairly 
high. 
III. PLAINTIFF ADEQUATELY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE IN HER OPENING BRIEF. 
Finally, Defendant claims that Plaintiff did not adequately marshal the evidence. 
However, there is no substance to this argument. Defendant does not point to a single 
piece of evidence that Plaintiff did not identify and address in the argument section of her 
91 
brief. Moreover, every piece of evidence that Defendant brings up in its brief was 
99 
properly stated with a citation to the record and addressed in Plaintiffs opening brief. 
20. Defendant's assertion that Dr. Colledge's testimony "was important, effective and 
assertive" while Dr. Rosenthal's was "cautious, tentative and uncertain" is an improper 
attempt to assert facts not in the record and should be stricken. 
21. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) requires that an appellant must "marshal all record 
evidence that supports the challenged finding" in the argument section of its opening 
brief. See also Rukavina v. Triatlantic Adventures, Inc., 931 P.2d 122, 125 (Utah 1997). 
There is no requirement to marshal evidence in the Statement of Facts section. See Utah 
R. App. P. 24(a)(7). 
22. See Br. Appellant 19-24, 25-30, 33-35, 41, 49-50, & 53. 
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Rather than a substantive argument, Defendant appears to have included this point 
in its brief in order to attempt to impugn Plaintiffs arguments without addressing them. 
Defendant refers to the evidence that Plaintiff marshals and addresses as "fragments" of 
evidence that Plaintiff "deigns to mention," (see Br. Appellee 15) without pointing out 
any piece of crucial evidence that Plaintiff fails to address. Defendant attempts to make 
an issue out of Plaintiff s choice to refer to the evidence she marshaled as "evidence that 
could be construed in favor of the jury's decision," (see Br. Appellee 15) without 
explaining what impact that word choice might have on the issues to be decided by the 
Court. Defendant insinuates that Plaintiff somehow acted improperly when she argued 
that the marshaled evidence is "'irrelevant' or opposed by other evidence, or rendered 
immaterial by some legal theory she argues overcomes the evidence," (see Br. Appellee 
15-16) notwithstanding the fact that Defendant itself pointed out one paragraph earlier 
that it was Plaintiffs burden to "ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence." West Valley City 
v. Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). The substance of that 
burden is "to correlate particular items of evidence with the challenged findings and 
convince [the appeals court] of the [lower] court's missteps in application of the evidence 
to its findings." Id.; see also Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 434 (Utah 1998) (stating that 
the marshaling party must "state fully and accurately all of the evidence on an issue and 
23. As an aside, Plaintiff submits that her word choices were not meant to imply that 
there was no adverse evidence, only that adverse record evidence would be included 
regardless of whether it was referenced later by the lower court or parties, such as the 
references to Wendy's pregnancy, depression and irritable bowel syndrome. (See Br. 
Appellant 29-30.) 
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then show, as a matter of law, that the evidence does not support the verdict."). This is 
exactly what Plaintiff has done in her opening brief. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully asks this Court to reverse the trial 
court's decision and remand for a new trial in this matter. 
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